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1. Introduction 
 
 
In contemporary philosophy of mind the extended cognition (EC) thesis holds that there are conditions 
under which cognitive processes and cognitive systems are spatiotemporally  spread across brain, body 
and  world  in  such  a  way  that  extra-neuronal  elements  in  close  interplay  with  neuronal  elements 
constitute some cognitive process or cognitive system (Clark 2008; Menary 2007, 2010; 2010abc; 
Rowlands 2010; Sutton 2010; Wheeler 2010; Wilson 2010). Despite the availability of weaker theses of 
embedded, situated, or scaffolded cognition (Robbins & Aydede 2009; Rupert 2009; Sterelny 2010), 
proponents  of EC argue that extra-neural  resources  do more than aid, sculpt, or augment  cognition: 
extra-neural resources are often constitutive elements of cognitive processing or cognitive systems. As 
Wilson   notes:   “Thus,   if  the  extended   mind   thesis   is  true,  it  is  true  in  virtue   of  something 
implementationally  deep about cognition.”  (2010, p. 171) Or, as Wheeler argues: “[…] the key issue 
facing [extended] theorists right now is not how to argue against the received (if that’s what it still is) 
orthodox view in cognitive science, but rather how to justify the transition from a “merely” embodied- 
embedded mind to an extended one.” (2010, p. 247) 
My aim in this paper is to argue that the philosophical accounts of mechanistic explanation, with a 
focus on compositional relations, provide a fertile framework for (a) exploring the ontological basis of 
EC-style explanations, and (b) dissolving the “coupling-constitution  fallacy” (Adams & Aizawa 2001, 
2008) objection leveled against EC. 
 
 
1.1. Scope of the argument and strategy 
 
 
In the  EC  literature,  “first-wave  EC”  (Clark  & Chalmers  1998;  Clark  2008;  Wheeler  2010)  is the 
classical version of EC based on functionalist considerations.  The constitution claim of first-wave EC 
is commonly expressed in terms of partial constitution, where a cognitive process or cognitive system 
is  partly  constituted  by  environmental  resources  playing  functionally  isomorphic  roles  in  guiding 
behavior  as those  realized  by neural  resources.  With  regards  to first-wave  EC,  I aim  to show  that 
attempting to base the constitution claim by way of functional isomorphism between the “internal” and 
the “external”  is problematic  and therefore  unlikely  to work  as intended  (Rowlands  2010;  Sprevak 
2009). Before  looking  at “second-wave  EC” (Menary  2007, 2010abc;  Sutton 2010), I explore  other 
options available to the EC theorist in order to make a case for the constitution claim. That is, the EC 
theorist could look to metaphysical relations as supervenience, material constitution, composition, or 
realization. I shall argue that the relata of material constitution and supervenience are problematic due 
to discrepancies between the properties of supervenience and material constitution and the properties of 
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extended cognitive systems. In contrast to these two building-relations,  the view I shall defend is that 
such  a  lack  of  fit  does  not  exist  between  the  properties  of  composition  and  realization  and  the 
properties of extended cognitive systems and processes. These latter relations of determination provide 
a more solid ground from which to re-evaluate EC-style constitution claims. 
In addition to first-wave EC, “second-wave EC” pursues the constitution claim from both 
complementarity arguments (Sutton 2010) and integrationist arguments (Menary 2007, 2010abc). Even 
though it shows signs of immunity against the problems hindering first-wave EC, I shall argue that the 
complementarity  view alone is insufficient to substantiate the constitution claim of EC. This is not due 
to  flaws  with  the  complementarity  view  itself,  but  rather  results  from  its  openness  to  a stalemate 
situation into which the debate over causal and constitutive dependence relations has fallen. Hence, it 
follows   that   for   complementarity   to   suffice,   it   requires   supplementation.   Menary’s   cognitive 
integrationist framework offers a better starting point from which to begin to solve the coupling- 
constitution fallacy. As a case in point, the cognitive integrationist does not begin from the premise that 
environmental  resources  become cognitive  simply by being coupled to an already existing cognitive 
agent (Menary 2006, p. 335). Instead Menary aims to explain how the coordination dynamics of 
heterogeneously  “internal”  and  “external”  components  assemble  extended  cognitive  processes  and 
cognitive systems. I follow Menary (see also Hurley 2010) in arguing that EC should focus less on 
explaining the metaphysics of EC and focus instead on explaining the empirical issue of “[…] why X 
and Y are so coordinated that they together function as Z […].” (2006, p. 334) 
The strategy of this paper is to argue that it is possible to supplement the cognitive integrationist 
framework by explaining the kinds of coordination dynamics that Menary has in mind by making use 
of the philosophical framework of mechanistic explanation and mechanistic composition. Doing so, I 
submit, generates two different but complementary theoretical models by which to approach the strong 
ontological claim of EC-style explanations. What is the relationship between these two approaches? On 
the one hand, the framework of cognitive integration establishes the constitution claim by explaining 
integration  on  a dimension  of  bodily  manipulations  constrained  by  socio-cultural  cognitive  norms, 
whereas  mechanistic   explanation   targets  the  emergence  of  cognitive  properties  on  the  systemic 
dimension of mechanistic organization. On the other hand, both approaches focus on providing sub- 
personal and mechanistic descriptions of cognitive processes and the formation of cognitive systems. 
 
 
2. Coupling-constitution  fallacy: 
 
 
I begin by exposing the coupling-constitution  fallacy (C-C fallacy). According to several critics of the 
thesis of EC (Adams & Aizawa 2001, 2008, 2009, 2010; 2010a; Rupert 2004; 2009), the most common 
and pervasive mistake EC-theorists make (Adams & Aizawa 2010, p. 68) is to tacitly move “from the 
observation that a process X is in some way causally connected (coupled) to a cognitive process Y to 
the conclusion that X is part of the cognitive process Y.” (Adams & Aizawa 2009, p. 81) Note that in 
this  passage  the  C-C  fallacy  concerns  cognitive  processes.  However,  the  fallacy  is  not  limited  to 
processes.  In the following  passage,  Adams & Aizawa criticize  Clark for making the fallacy on the 
level of cognitive processes and also the level of entire cognitive systems: 
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“When  Clark makes an object cognitive  when it is connected  to a cognitive  agent, he is committing  an 
instance  of  a  ‘‘coupling-constitution  fallacy.’’  This  is  the  most  common  mistake  that  extended  mind 
theorists make. The fallacious pattern is to draw attention to cases, real or imagined, in which some object 
or process is coupled in some fashion to some cognitive agent. From this, one slides to the conclusion that 
the object or process constitutes part of the agent’s cognitive apparatus or cognitive processing. If you are 
coupled  to your pocket  notebook  in the sense of always  having  it readily  available,  use it a lot, trust it 
implicitly,  and  so forth,  then  Clark  infers  that  the  pocket  notebook  constitutes  a part  of your  memory 
store.” (2010, pp. 67-68) 
 
 
It follows,  according  to the critics, that one is committing  an instance  of the C-C fallacy when one 
conflates  observations  about  an  individual  cognitive  agent’s  causal  interactions  with  extra-neural 
resources  or observations  about dynamical  coupling  relations  between  an individual  cognitive  agent 
and parts of the extra-neural world, with those extra-neural elements being constitutive parts of an 
individual’s   cognitive   process  or  cognitive   system.  Before  looking  at  the  different  constitution 
arguments in first- and second-wave EC, it is important to be clear about what role the appeal to causal 
interaction or causal coupling is intended to play in the argument for EC. Both Clark (2008, p. 87) and 
Menary (2010c, p. 608) are particularly clear about this. As Clark says, the “appeal to coupling is not 
intended to make any external object cognitive […]. Rather, it is intended to make some object, which 
in and of itself is not usefully […] thought of as either cognitive or noncognitive, into a proper part of 
some cognitive routine.” (2008, p. 87; italics in original) So it immediately appears as if the EC theorist 
can counter at least one aspect of the C-C fallacy, namely the charge that EC is guilty of making an 
object cognitive just by the object being coupled to a cognitive agent. However, the EC theorist has yet 
to counter Adams & Aizawa’s claim that any inference from coupling to the conclusion that “external” 
elements are constitutive parts of an extended cognitive system or cognitive process is an instance of 
the C-C fallacy. It is to these arguments that I now turn. 
 
 
3. First-wave EC & extended functionalism 
 
 
First-wave EC aims at grounding the constitution claim on functionalist considerations. In “In Defense 
of Extended Functionalism” (2010), Wheeler provides the following argument concerning whether 
“external” elements qualify as proper parts of an extended cognitive process or system: 
 
 
1. “If psychological  phenomena  are constituted  by their causal-functional  role, then our terms for 
mental  states,  mental  processes,  and  so  on  pick  out  equivalence  classes  of  different  material 
substrates,  any  one  of which  might  in principle  realize  the type-identified  states  or process  in 
question.” (Wheeler 2010, p. 248; compare Clark 2005, p. 2) 
2. “If there is functional equality with respect to governing behavior, between the causal contribution 
of certain  internal  elements  and the causal contribution  of certain  external  elements,  and if the 
internal elements concerned qualify as the proper parts of a cognitive trait, then there is no good 
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reason  to deny equivalent  status - that is, cognitive  status - to the relevant  external  elements.” 
 
(Wheeler 2010, p. 248; compare Clark 2008, p. 50) 
 
3. If parity of causal contribution  mandates  parity of status, and if mental states and processes  are 
multiply realizable, then “it is possible for the very same type-identified cognitive state or process 
to be available in two different generic formats - one non-extended  and one extended.” (Wheeler 
2010, p. 248) 
 
4.     Therefore:  Cognitive  processes  and states  are realizable  (partly  at least)  by external  states  and 
 
processes (Wheeler 2010, p. 249; compare Clark 2008, p. 39). 
 
The  logical  form  of  this  argument  follows  from  the  functionalist  parity  principle  (PP)  originally 
 
introduced by Clark & Chalmers (1998): 
 
 
“If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it done in the head, 
we would have no hesitation in recognizing  as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is 
[…] part of the cognitive process.” (1998, p. 2) 
 
To make sense of Wheeler’s  argument and the PP, I shall revisit Clark & Chalmers’ original case of 
Otto & Inga (1998, pp. 12-14). In a similar vein as Wheeler, Clark & Chalmers invite us to consider the 
idea that a cognitive process, namely a standing belief about the location of the Museum of Modern Art 
(MoMA) in New York, could be instantiated in two different generic formats. In the example, Otto & 
Inga hear about an art exhibition at MoMA. After hearing the news about the exhibition, Inga thinks 
about the location of MoMA, remembers  that it is on 53
rd  
St., and sets off. Otto, on the other hand, 
suffers from a mild form of Alzheimer’s and is therefore unable to reliably use his biological memory 
to recall the address. Fortunately for Otto, he always – as a compensatory strategy – writes down useful 
 
information in a notebook. Just like Inga, Otto hears about the exhibition, but quite unlike Inga, Otto 
consults his notebook, retrieves the address, and sets off. Moving from the philosophical theory of 
functionalism,  which holds that psychological  states like beliefs  are constituted  not by way of their 
material makeup but rather in terms of their causal-functional  role in generating appropriate behavior, 
the result that the proponents of first-wave EC want us to accept is that type-identified mental states are 
available in both a non-extended and an extended format. 
 
 
3.1. Problems with first-wave EC & extended functionalism 
 
 
Unlike  the  standard  anti-EC  arguments   (Rupert  2004),  where  it  is  commonly   argued  that  the 
constitution claim of EC fails because of the obvious distinctiveness between the fine-grained profile of 
“internal,” neural operations and the profiles of “external,” sociocultural operations, the particular kind 
of arguments that I shall explore in this section do not revolve around this kind of skepticism. I agree 
with Menary (2010, p. 5) and Wheeler (2010, p. 248) that it is incorrect to interpret the PP as entailing 
any fine-grained functional similarity between the properties of “internal” and “external” mechanisms 
and their operations.  Instead  a satisfactory  response  to the kind of objections  that I shall deal with 
begins  by  acknowledging  that  functionalism  was  engineered,  in  part,  so  as  to  avoid  chauvinistic 
exclusion  of cognition  or mentality  from individuals  (or organisms)  with differences  in fine-grained 
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causal-functional profile or in fine-grained physiological makeup (Block 1980). 
 
 
3.1.1. Sprevak’s Martian intuition 
 
 
Sprevak  (2009)  presents  first-wave  EC  with  an  intriguing  dilemma:  (a)  accept  functionalism  and 
radical EC; or, (b) give up EC entirely (2009, p. 503). The point that Sprevak wishes to make is that if 
one accepts functionalism, then one is committed to a radical and implausible version of EC, where the 
price of taking EC on board is “rampant expansion  of the mind into the world […].” (2009, p. 503) 
Here is the form of Sprevak’s argument: 
 
 
1.     Functionalism entails the Martian intuition (P). 
 
2.     If P, then radical EC (Q). 
 
3.     P. 
 
4.     Therefore, Q. 
 
 
So,  if  functionalism   entails   the  Martian   intuition   and  if  EC  builds   its  constitutive   claim   on 
functionalism,  then first-wave  EC is committed  to a radically  implausible  version  of EC where  the 
following  scenario  holds:  simply  by  picking  up  a book,  one  comes  to  believe  all  the  information 
contained in that book. In other words, everything stored in that token book is necessarily a part of my 
cognition (or mind). Following Sprevak’s argument, the justification for this (wild) claim is as follows: 
(a) a Martian might “internally” encode memories in ink-marks; (b) in addition to gaining its beliefs via 
sense modalities, such a Martian might equally be born with innate beliefs; (c) moreover, it is possible 
that the Martian might have such innate beliefs that it has not yet examined, viz., that the Martian has a 
library of data phylogenetically  hardwired  into its cognitive  system;  and (d) finally it is possible  to 
imagine  that this Martian  has such a stock of innate beliefs stored in an ink-based  memory  system, 
most  of which  it has not yet had any reason  (or cause)  to employ.  Sprevak’s  point  is that it quite 
plausible to think that such a creature could exist. As Sprevak says, the: 
 
 
“Martian  has  ink-marks  inside  its  head  that,  if  it were  sufficiently  diligent,  would  guide  its  action  in 
appropriate  ways. The difference  between the Martian and me is that it has the ink-marks  inside its head, 
while I have the ink-marks outside. By the fair-treatment principle, if the Martian has beliefs, then so do I.” 
(2009, p. 518) 
 
 
If  Sprevak  is  correct,  basing  the  constitution  claim  on  the  PP  would  seem  to  license  an  overly 
permissive and implausible attribution of cognitive processes or states. Hence, it is not clear that the PP 
can be used as a principle of demarcation between what is and what is not a proper part of an extended 
cognitive system or process. One might attempt to augment the PP by reference to the so-called “glue- 
and-trust  conditions”  (Clark  &  Chalmers  1998).  The  glue-and-trust  conditions  state  that  external 
resources might count as part of cognition only if such resources are (a) reliably available and typically 
invoked, (b) more-or-less  automatically  endorsed, and (c) that the information  carried in the resource 
be easily accessible when required (1998, p. 17). According to Sprevak, these conditions will not save 
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first-wave EC, since it is not necessary for an environmental resource to be part of a cognitive system 
or process that such a resource fulfill (a)-(c). Here I restrict myself to condition (a). On Sprevak’s view, 
it is possible to imagine a Martian, whose cognitive resources are only available after a good night’s 
sleep, and that this Martian does not reliably or often get a good night’s sleep. However, “that does not 
stop, on those occasions when the Martian does get a good night’s sleep, those resources from counting 
as  genuinely  cognitive.”  (Sprevak  2009,  pp.  515-16)  So  it  would  seem  that  the  glue-and-trust 
conditions  would  not  save  first-wave  EC  from  the  negative  ramifications  entailed  by  the  Martian 
intuition. 
3.1.2. Rowland’s impasse 
 
 
But should we just accept Sprevak’s argument? One response that is available to first-wave EC is to go 
between the horns of the dilemma, by arguing that the relevant level of grain by which we “individuate 
functional  roles should be set neither too high (so as not to entail radical EC) nor too low (so as to 
block the critics’ difference-argument).”  (Anonymous referee) Wheeler (2010) takes up this line of 
response.  Note  that  this  is  not  the  only  way  the  EC  theorist  could  attempt  to  deflate  Sprevak’s 
argument. Second-wave EC seems immune to the Martian intuition. For instance, on Menary’s version 
of cognitive  integration,  it is not functional  similarity  that matters,  but rather  how the coordination 
between functionally dissimilar “inner” and “outer” elements are integrated to establish deeply hybrid 
minds (Menary 2006, p. 333). As Theiner has recently said about second-wave EC, it is one “which is 
completely  devoid  of  this  questionable  presupposition  [functional  similarity  between  “inner”  and 
“outer], and thus affords a logically independent path to the claim that cognition is extended.” (2011, p. 
52) However, the question that shall entertain us here is whether Wheeler’s case holds water? 
 
Rowlands has argued that establishing the relevant level of granularity with respect to functional 
roles – between those who accept EC and those who do not – leads to an impasse, the ramifications 
having a paralyzing affect on the entire debate over cognitive distribution: 
 
 
“If  Rupert’s  arguments   against  the  extended  mind  are  question-begging   because  they  presuppose   a 
chauvinistic  form  of functionalism,  it is difficult  to see  why  arguments  for the  extended  mind  are  not 
question-begging  given their predication  on a liberal form of functionalism.”  (Rowlands,  unpublished  ms, 
pp. 6-7; quoted from Wheeler 2010, p. 255; see also Rowlands 2010, pp. 209-10) 
 
 
In what we might call Rupert-style  anti-EC (2004, 2009; see also Adam & Aizawa 2001, 2008), the 
most  common  way  of  criticizing  extended  functionalism  consists  in  noting  a  set  of  psychological 
properties  found in human  cognitive  systems  but not socio-cultural  systems,  and then inferring  that 
there is no parity at the level of fine-grained functional operations between “inner” and “outer”. Hence, 
EC must be false. The proponents  of first-wave  EC commonly  respond  to this line of argument  by 
charging Rupert-style  anti-EC of advocating a chauvinistic  form of functionalism;  one that privileges 
the neuronal innards solely on their fine-grained psychological profile. As Wheeler says, “it seems that 
Rupert’s […] argument continues to beg the question against extended functionalism. […], extended 
functionalism  looks  to  be  predicated  on  the  more  liberal  form  of  functionalism  that  generates  a 
locationally uncommitted account of the cognitive.” (2010, p. 255) It is from the problem of identifying 
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the appropriate  level of functional  grain that Rowlands  concludes  that the debate over EC has fallen 
 
into an impasse, with both sides potentially begging the question against one another 
 
 
3.1.3. Theiner’s rule of extended fairness 
 
 
The trouble confronting Wheeler’s reply to the Martian intuition is not only limited to the debate over 
extended functionalism. As Rowlands points out (2010, p. 210), the problem of identifying the correct 
level of grain is an old problem for functionalist theories of mind, the solution being far from readily 
available.   One   could   argue,   with   the  aim   of  saving   Wheeler’s   strategy,   that  just  because   a 
“compromise-solution”  on how to set the benchmarks for functional grain have plagued philosophical 
functionalism   in  the  past  (and  still  does),  this  does  not  present  a  lethal  problem  for  extended 
functionalism. Theiner endorses such a position. In his (2011), Theiner introduces what he calls the rule 
of “extended  fairness”:  “Don’t  burden  the theory  of the extended  mind  with problems  that equally 
affect theories of the non-extended mind.” (2011, p. 34) According to Theiner, both Sprevak (2009) and 
Rowlands  (unpublished  ms) disregard  this rule precisely  because  they are pointing  to flaws that not 
only affect EC but equally non-extended versions of functionalism. I agree with Theiner on this issue: 
the  fact  that  this  problem   poses  “an  equal  challenge   for  internalist   and  extended   versions  of 
functionalism shows that the problem cannot be specific to the HEC (rather than functionalism 
simpliciter).”  (2011,  p.  35;  italic  in  original)  However,  this  response  is  not  completely  satisfying 
because the proponent of Rupert-style  anti-EC can force the issue, “and demand a further reason for 
why we should consider the external resources as part of a single, transcranially extended cognitive 
process.” (Theiner 2011, p. 56) Hence, even if “it would be premature to declare that the debate over 
extended  functionalism  suffers  from  a lethal  kind  of indeterminacy  […],”  (Theiner  2011,  p. 49)  it 
leaves the debate between Rupert-style anti-EC and EC unresolved. 
 
 
4. Causation, material constitution, supervenience, composition and realization! 
 
 
The point of the preceding section has been to present evidence suggesting that basing the strong 
ontological  claim of EC by appealing to the functionalist  PP of first-wave EC is problematic.  In this 
section, I consider a variety of other options available to the EC theorist in making a case for the 
constitution  claim.  I  begin  by  giving  a  brief  sketch  of  the  causation  relation.  This  is  done  to 
accommodate  Menary’s  claim that an “account  of the difference  between  causation  and constitution 
would be helpful here, but there is none forthcoming […].” (2010, p. 607) 
 
 
4.1. Causation 
 
! 
 
Causation is a temporal and asymmetric relation between cause and effect: if y is caused by x at t, then 
 
x do not spatiotemporally  overlap with y. In a slogan: causes precede their effects (Craver & Bechtel 
 
2007, p. 552; Shapiro 2010, pp. 159-61). As such, a causal relation between y and x is such that the 
 
space-time path of y is distinct from the space-time path of x. For instance, to make sense of why the 
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constitution relation does not entail a relation of causation, Rowlands introduces the following example 
 
(originally due to Davidson 1987): 
 
 
“Dependence, even essential dependence, does not add up to constitution – not without a lot of 
argument. Sunburn is (essentially) dependent on solar radiation in the sense that any skin 
discoloration  not produced by solar radiation is not sunburn. But this does not mean that solar 
radiation is literally part of – a component of – sunburn.” (2010, p. 56; italics in original) 
 
 
It follows that solar radiation causes sunburn but does not constitute sunburn. At no point in time does 
solar radiation either spatially coincide or materially overlap with sunburn. As Rowlands intends us to 
understand the sunburn-example, sunburn is individuation-dependent  on its causal etiology, since being 
overexposed to incident UV-radiation can cause sunburn. But it does not follow that solar radiation is 
literally part of the sunburnt skin. Contrast this initially with material constitution: if x takes place prior 
to y, or if x takes place apart from y, or if x and y reciprocally influence each other, then x causes, but 
does not constitute, y (Shapiro 2010). 
 
 
4.2. Material Constitution 
 
 
Material constitution is a non-causal and synchronic (atemporal) relation of ontological determination 
between spatially and materially co-located objects, processes or properties of different or similar kind 
(Bennett  2011).  The  constitution  relation  can  be  framed  in  terms  of how  to  fill  out  the  following 
schema: x constitutes y at t if and only if              ? (Wasserman 2004, p. 694). In analytical metaphysics, 
the philosophical home of constitution debates, there is some dispute about how to adequately fill out 
this schema. However, it is widely accepted that x constitutes y if and only if the constitution relation 
upholds the following coincidence and formal conditions. There are two coincidence conditions. First, 
constitution  requires  spatial coincidence:  x constitutes  y at t only  if x and  y have  the same  spatial 
location  at t. Second,  constitution  requires  material coincidence:  x constitutes  y at t only if x and y 
share all the same parts at t (Wasserman  2004, p. 694; Wilson 2007, p. 5). In conjunction  with these 
conditions of coincidence, it is widely accepted that the relation of constitution respects the following 
three formal conditions. First, the constitution relation is transitive: if x constitutes y, and if x (or the xs) 
is (are)  constituted  by z (or the zs), then y is constituted  by z (or the zs). Second,  the constitution 
relation is irreflexive: x constitutes y and neither y nor x constitute themselves. Finally, the constitution 
relation  is asymmetric:  x constitutes  y, y does not constitute  x (or the xs). According  to Wasserman 
(2004, p. 695; see also Baker 2000; Lowe 1989), these conditions are minimal requirements offered by 
constitution theorists. 
We are now able to highlight a few important features distinguishing causation from material 
constitution. First, both material constitution and causation are asymmetric relations of dependence. 
However,  unlike  the  asymmetry  of  causation,  the  property  of  asymmetry  on  material  constitution 
relations is a “one-to-one” relation of determination. That is to say, when y is caused by x and time t1, x 
necessarily precedes y on a temporal dimension. So on a causal relation, the cause (x) and the effect (y) 
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do not spatiotemporally overlap. This is different on the relation of material constitution, since here the 
asymmetry is to be understood as follows: if a piece of clay constitutes a token statue, the piece of clay 
and the statue overlap in a spatiotemporal sense. This is why relations of material constitution – and not 
causal  relations  – are one-to-one  relations  of determination.  Second,  the synchronic  (or atemporal) 
nature of material constitution sets it apart from causation, for while cause and effect are independent 
events in time, the relation between constituent(s) and constituted is simultaneous. 
There  are several  problems  with this relation  of determination  at least insofar  as it is employed  in 
helping EC justify its constitution claim. The first problem is ontological in the sense that material 
constitution requires material coincidence between parts and whole: x constitutes y at t only if x and y 
share  all the  same  parts  at t. However,  this  condition  does  not  fit with  the  nature  of an  extended 
cognitive system. One objection to this claim is to argue that the structured collection “of the relevant 
parts of” brain, body, and world which are presumed  to materially  constitute  an extended  cognitive 
system at time t have all the same parts of the extended cognitive system at time t – viz., the extended 
cognitive  system  exists  at  time  t  wherever  its  physically  constitutive  parts  are  at  time  t.  I  am 
sympathetic  to this claim, since it is indeed  the case that an extended  cognitive  system  at time t is 
wherever its component parts are at time t. Moreover, it likely does not follow that all (mereological) 
parts,  P, of the  physical  objects  partly  constituting,  at time  t, an extended  cognitive  system  S, are 
equally  parts of S. The point that I wish to highlight,  though,  is different:  the material  coincidence 
condition does not mesh with the hybrid character of extended cognitive systems, since even if y shares 
all the parts of the xs, this does not hold at the level of the constituents. The xs do not share the same 
parts. In addition to this, the xs are temporally and spatially distributed from one another. Hence, unlike 
the relation of clay and statue, the dynamics and characteristics  between the larger extended cognitive 
system  and  its  parts  do  not  correspond  with  material  constitution.  The  second  problem  is  formal. 
Material  constitution  is  a  non-causal,  asymmetrical  relation  of  ontological  determination.  But,  the 
empirical fundament of EC is inherently causal and symmetrical, in the sense that the empirical basis 
of  an  extended  cognitive  system  is formulated  in  terms  of  a dynamically  coupled,  co-determining 
relation between agent and ecological niche (Beer 2000; Clark 1997; Van Gelder 1995). 
 
 
4.3. Supervenience 
 
 
I include supervenience here because proponents of EC refer to this kind of relation in order to ground 
the constitution claim. For instance, Wilson & Clark claim: “we should treat the nonbiological 
augmentation as part of the material supervenience base for some of Otto’s long-term, nonoccurrent, 
dispositional  beliefs […].” (2009, p. 66) Supervenience,  just as material constitution,  is a non-causal 
and atemporal relation between, e.g., mental properties and properties of physical processes. But unlike 
material constitution, there is a general consensus that the supervenience relation does not guarantee a 
relation of ontological  dependence  (McLaughlin  & Bennett 2005). As such, a supervenience  relation 
does not necessarily guarantee a relation of constitution. This fact in itself makes the appeal to 
supervenience  problematic  as an  attempt  to underpin  the  constitution  claim  of EC.  In all fairness, 
Wilson  & Clark  mention  other  forms  of ontological  dependence  relations  – in particular,  Wilson’s 
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(2001, 2004, 2005) theory of “wide-realization.”  I discuss this in the next section. Here I shall keep 
focusing on the relation of supervenience. According to McLaughlin & Bennett (2005), all a relation of 
supervenience  establishes prima facie is a relation of covariance between, e.g., mental properties and 
physical properties. Moreover, unlike material constitution, supervenience is reflexive. There can be no 
variation on mental properties (M) unless there is variation in physical properties (P), and vice versa, 
given  that  M  =  P.  Finally,  in  contrast  to  material  constitution,  the  supervenience  relation  is  non- 
symmetric, i.e., the supervenience relation alters between symmetric and asymmetric instantiations 
(McLaughlin & Bennett 2005). 
!4.4. Composition 
 
 
Composition  is a non-causal and synchronic relation of ontological  dependence  and it holds between 
 
heterogeneous  elements,  e.g., between  a mechanism  and its complementing  parts (Craver & Bechtel 
 
2007, p. 547). Again we can frame the composition relation in terms of how to fill out the following 
schema: x (or the xs) compose(s) y at t if and only if              ? (Hawley 2006, p. 483). Unlike material 
constitution,  where  something  is  a  material  constitution  relation  if  and  only  if  it  upholds  certain 
coincidence condition, compositional relations are less demanding in that they require only coexistence 
conditions.  First, composition  requires only spatial coexistence:  the xs compose  y at t only if y as a 
whole share the same space-time path as the xs and no two of the xs occupy an overlapping space-time 
path (Hawley 2006, p. 483). In the case of extended cognitive systems, the system as a whole coexists 
spatially with the mereological  sum of the parts, and none of the parts occupy overlapping regions of 
space. On a first pass, then, an extended cognitive system exhibits the property of spatial coexistence. 
Second,  composition  requires  material  coexistence:  the  xs  compose  y at  t only  if  y as  a whole  is 
composed of the material parts of the xs and no two of the xs materially overlap in terms of their parts. 
This fits the nature of an extended cognitive system, in the sense that EC theorists often conceive of 
such systems as collectively composed of disparate parts, none of which materially overlap. Hence, the 
component parts of an extended cognitive system occupy non-identical spatial locations within one 
distributed cognitive system. 
To make it clear which kind of compositional relation I have in mind here, I shall adopt Craver’s 
(2007)   taxonomy   distinguishing   between   four   different   notions   of   composition:   mereological, 
aggregative, spatial/material,  and mechanistic composition. The notion of composition I shall support, 
and the one lending support to an explanation of the emergence of higher-level cognitive properties is 
mechanistic composition (Theiner 2009). First, consider the “extensionality theorem” inherent to the 
mereological  relation  of composition:  “an object  is completely  determined  by the set of its parts.” 
(Craver  2007,  p.  185)  In  contrast  to  mechanistic  composition,  where  emphasis  is  on  explaining 
emergent higher-level phenomena by reference to the organization-dependence of the enabling system, 
the extensionality  theorem  implies  the structural  organization  of the systemic  components  does not 
matter as an ontological principle. Second, on the aggregativity relation of composition, “the relata are 
properties  of wholes  and the properties  of parts, and the relation  between  them  is that higher-level 
properties  are  sums  of  lower-level  properties.”  (Craver  2007,  p. 186)  However  following  Wimsatt 
(1974, 1986), Theiner (2009, 2011) has recently argued that the emergence  of complex properties  in 
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extended cognitive systems is a result of that system failing to exhibit aggregativity in its structural 
composition (Theiner & O’Connor 2010, p. 84). Hence, aggregate systems lack the required integration 
between its component parts to be explanatorily useful in addressing EC’s constitution claim. Third, the 
relation of material and spatial composition equally fails to capture the nature of extended cognitive 
systems. For instance, as Craver notes, “thinking of levels in this way does not allow one to distinguish 
between mere pieces and its components.” (2007, p. 187; italics in original) Decomposing a system into 
mere spatial and material pieces does not (and will be highly unlikely to) guarantee decomposition into 
the systemic components, i.e., elements “that make identifiable contributions to the behavior of a 
mechanism.”  (Craver 2007, p. 188) Fourth, Craver defines the relation of mechanistic composition as 
follows:  “X’s  Φ-ing  is  at  a  lower  mechanistic  level  than  S’s  Ψ-ing.  Lower-level  components  are 
organized together to form higher-level components.” (2007, p. 189) Consider, for instance, the 
compositional layout of a synapse. A synapse is composed of part of a pre-synaptic cell, part of a post- 
synaptic  cell  and  of the gap  between  the pre-  and  post-synaptic  cells.  According  to Craver,  “what 
unifies  these  items  into  a  component  is  their  organized  behavior:  the  pre-synaptic  cell  releases 
transmitters that traverse the cleft and act on the post-synaptic cell.” (2007, p. 190) Mechanistic 
composition, to be spelled out in further detail in the section “Mechanistic compositional organization,” 
supplements an explanation of the organization of extended cognitive systems, underpinning the claim 
of deeply integrated and hybrid cognitive systems. 
 
 
4.5. Realization 
 
 
The relation  of realization  has played  some  role in the debate  over EC, predominantly  in Wilson’s 
theory  of “wide  realization”  (1994,  1995,  2004,  2005).  According  to Wilson,  realization  is usually 
taken to imply that physical realizers are “determinative” of the properties they realize and “physically 
constitutive”   of  the  intrinsic  states  of  the  individuals   with  those  properties   (2001,  p.  1).  The 
determinative part of realization, Wilson calls the metaphysical sufficiency thesis: “Realizers are 
metaphysically sufficient for the properties or states that they realize.” (2004, p. 103) The physically 
constitutive part of the standard view, Wilson refers to as the physical constitutivity thesis: “Realizers 
of states and properties are exhaustively physically constituted by the intrinsic, physical states of the 
individual whose states or properties they are.” (2004, p. 104) Central to Wilson’s argument is that the 
conjunction of the metaphysical sufficiency thesis and the physical constitutivity thesis is false, since a 
“metaphysically robust notion of realization is ineliminably context-sensitive.” (2001, p. 1; italics in 
original) As a case in point, consider Rumelhart & McClelland’s (1986) classical example of using pen 
and paper to complete a mathematical  algorithm. According to Wilson & Clark (2009), what initially 
starts as causal interactions between neural representational or informational processes and cultural 
representational  or informational processes become “incorporated as part of the computational process 
itself.”  (Wilson  & Clark  2009, p. 10) This case shows  that on some  occasions  cognitive  properties 
“have realizers that extend beyond the individual instantiating them.” (Wilson 2004, p. 107) 
Generally there is much to like about the idea of wide realization, since it fits with the ontology of 
 
extended  cognitive  systems  and  processes.  But,  it  also  seems  evident  that  the  project  of  wide 
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realization turns on its empirical substantiation  before its metaphysical  one. Hence, to avoid begging 
the question  about where to place the causal-constitutive  boundary  (Hurley  2010), we can launch  a 
wide  realization  argument  for EC only after  having  empirically  based  the validity  of EC. It is this 
project that the philosophical account of mechanistic explanation can help with. 
 
 
5. Second-wave EC and Complementarity 
 
 
Kirchhoff (2011) has recently shown – in his exploration  of a distinctive third-wave version of EC – 
that second-wave EC is quite unlike EC based on the PP and extended functionalism. The big question 
of this section is: does second-wave  EC provide the fodder required to justify its constitution  claim? 
The argument that I shall pursue is as follows: complementarity alone is insufficient to ground the 
constitution  claim of EC essentially because complementarity  is open to a kind of stalemate scenario 
into which the debate over causal relations and constitutive relations has fallen. I am not the only one 
skeptical of the complementarity  framework. Theiner (2011) has recently argued that second-wave EC 
– which he refers to as cognitive integration – does not imply EC unless second-wave EC is augmented 
with some version of the PP (see also Rowlands 2010). However, unlike the original formulation of the 
PP, which is pitched at the level of resources, Theiner argues that the PP should be applied to the level 
of capacities from which one can then individuate entire systems or processes as cognitive. I agree with 
this, since my conclusion points in a similar direction, namely that the second-wave EC proponent still 
needs  an  argument  for  why  this  particular  system  as  a  whole  is  a  system  of  type  Z  (where  Z  = 
cognitive). Having discussed the complementarity  framework, I shall then explore the main argument 
of this paper. 
 
 
5.1. The Complementarity Argument 
 
 
 
Psychologists  (Donald  1991)  and  philosophers  of  cognitive  science  (Sutton  2010)  inform  us  that 
standard external memory records, or exograms,  like those found in Otto’s notebook, are stored in a 
discrete fashion (e.g., like the words ‘milk’, ‘meat’, and ‘fruit’ on a grocery list). That is, their 
representational schemes are either linguistic or pictorial (or maybe both). They exhibit no dynamics or 
activity  (for  instance,  they  are not prone  to primacy  or recency  effects).  Nor  are they  intrinsically 
integrated with other memory records (e.g., they are not subject to negative transfer effects). Inga’s 
biological memory, in contrast, may well blend and interfere (Sutton 2010, p. 197), and is vulnerable to 
degradation  (Donald  1998,  p.  15).  Moreover,  unlike  encodings  in  exograms,  biological  memory 
exhibits such dynamic features such as informational holism (Clark 1989, p. 107). Additionally, the 
representational  formats  of biological  memory  are composed  and stored in the connection  strengths 
between the units of neural nets as exemplified  in artificial neural networks,  which is very different 
from symbolic and pictorial representations. In accordance with complementarity, it is precisely this 
disparate nature – this deep mechanistic dissimilarity – between neural and extra-neural elements that 
explains  why agents  accomplish  cognitive  tasks that the ‘naked  brain’  alone  could  not achieve.  As 
Sutton explains:  “Brains  like ours need media, objects,  and other people  to function  fully as minds 
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[…]: biological traces are typically integrative, active, and reconstructive,  but in using them we hook 
up with more enduring and transmissible  exograms, mostly of our own making, with supplement and 
extend our powers.” (2010, p. 205) However, the complementarity  framework still faces a worry that 
we now ought to expose. 
! 
 
5.2. The stalemate problem 
 
!!!             ! 
 
Here is the argument in its conceptual form (for a similar argument see Rowlands 2010, pp. 90-91): An 
inherent assumption of the C-C fallacy is that even if second-wave EC requires essential differences 
between “internal” and “external” processes, this by itself is insufficient to justify the inference that the 
latter has cognitive status – the reason being that it remains an open empirical question whether the 
“external” parts merely make up an incredibly important array of extra-neuronal  scaffolding in which 
what constitutes real cognition is internally, neurobiologically  generated (Rupert 2010, p. 348). Hence, 
even if Otto and his notebook differ importantly in their fine-grained dynamics, it does not follow that 
the notebook in virtue of being coupled to or used by Otto-the-agent becomes part of Otto’s cognitive 
processing   rather   than   merely   augmenting   Otto’s   capacity   to  perform   a  cognitive   task,   e.g., 
remembering.  However,  as Theiner mentions,  this will not scare the complementarity  theorist,  since 
she/he will typically respond to this charge by “claiming that what makes the external parts of the 
transcranial process as cognitive as its internal parts is the fact that they all make some distinctive, 
functionally indispensable causal contribution to the exercise of a cognitive capacity.” (2011, p. 56) It 
is this  move  that  makes  the (potential)  stalemate  emerge,  since  now  there  seems  to be no way  of 
resolving the question whether “external” elements merely causally contribute – perhaps in some deep 
way  –  to  cognitive  processes  and  systems  or  whether  these  elements  in  part  constitute  cognitive 
processes  and  systems.  Given  that  both  anti-EC  and  EC  can accommodate  the view  that  there  are 
uniquely  and important  differences  between  “internal”  and “external”  processes  (Adams  & Aizawa 
2001; Clark 1998; Rupert 2004; Sutton 2006, 2010), why should we prefer a “constitutive” over a 
“scaffolding”  view of external, cognition-enhancing  resources?  If this kind of indeterminacy  poses a 
real problem for second-wave  EC, then it would seem that complementarity  itself does not suffice in 
order to substantiate the constitution claim. This does not entail that the EC theorist should reject a 
commitment  to complementarity;  rather, it indicates  that complementarity  needs to be supplemented 
further. This I take to be the job of Menary’s cognitive integrationist model. 
 
 
6. Second-wave EC and cognitive integration 
 
 
Following Menary, I shall argue, firstly, that the focus of cognitive integration on the dimension of 
manipulation and cognitive norms establishes one way that EC can ground its ontological claim. In his 
Dimensions  of  Mind,  Menary  analyzes  “epistemic  actions”  –  involving  a  reciprocal  coordination 
between the embodied organism and its cognitive niche – so as to support the strong ontological claim 
of EC. Epistemic actions are examples of Menary’s “manipulation thesis,” (MT) which he defines as: 
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“The  manipulation  thesis  as  a  constituent  thesis  of  cognitive  integration  is  first  understood  to  be  an 
embodied   engagement   with   the  world,   […].   Secondly   it  is  not  simply   a  causal   relation,   bodily 
manipulations  are also normative  – they are embodied practices developed through habit and training and 
governed by cognitive norms.” (Menary 2007, p. 84) 
 
 
As a constitutive thesis of cognitive integration, the MT establishes just why Menary is not pursuing a 
metaphysical  conception  of  constitution  but  rather  an  empirically  sensitive  understanding  of  the 
ontological  basis  of  extended  cognitive  systems  and  processes.  The  MT  explains  how  cognitive 
processes  and systems  are assembled  by both habituated  bodily  patterns  of actions,  viz., by way of 
body schemas (Gallagher 2005), and the cultural practices that govern such actions (Hutchins 2008). 
The coordination of brain, body and environmental resources is governed by cultural and social norms 
and practices. Hence, the MT begins from the perspective that “we are actively embodied in a socially 
constructed cognitive niche […] and this has led to the development of hybrid cognitive systems where 
the bodily manipulations  of vehicles […] in the niche involves the coordination of neural, bodily, and 
environmental vehicles.” (2010c, p. 611) To make this a bit more concrete, let us consider how Menary 
defends the MT by reference to Kirsh & Maglio’s (1994; see also Kirsh 1995; 2009) work on epistemic 
actions in the case of Tetris. 
Epistemic  actions  are a class of actions,  which make mental  computation  (processing)  “easier, 
faster, or more reliable.” (Kirsh & Maglio 1994, p. 513) In accordance with the MT, epistemic actions 
have this cognitive consequence,  because the underlying  components  of epistemic actions are spread 
across neural, bodily, and socio-cultural  resources. Instead of relying purely on “internal” processing, 
Kirsh & Maglio argue that actively manipulating structures in the environment alters the informational 
structure of the immediate environment, thereby reducing the need for too much “internal” processing. 
In their study of Tetris, it turns out that expert players, by physically manipulating the falling zoids on 
the screen  rather than rotating  the zoids mentally,  can rotate a zoid 90° in only 100 ms, where the 
process of mental rotation takes circa 800-1200 ms (Kirsh & Maglio 1994, p. 514). Epistemic actions 
thus allow a player (or in the more general case, a cognizer) to reap important time-related benefits. As 
Menary argues, the actions that Tetris players perform directly transform the informational structure of 
the  environment  (Menary  2010b,  p.  566).  On  this  view,  epistemic  actions  are  literally  part  of  the 
problem  solving  process.  As Kirsh & Maglio  state about their approach  – “its chief novelty  lies in 
allowing individual functional units inside the agent to be in closed-loop interactions with the outside 
world.” (1994, p. 542) Or, as Menary claims: “Epistemic actions and computations  take place within 
the same state space. If this state space is the problem-solving  state space, then we have difficulty in 
pulling  apart  mind,  action  and  world  […].”  (2007,  p.  90)  One  might  object  that  without  further 
argument the notion of “within the same state-space” is somewhat ambiguous. However, this would be 
to misinterpret  the explanation  given  by Menary  (2010b).  By “state-space”  it is clear  that  Menary 
means  “information  processing  space,”  which  “includes  both  processes  in  the  head,  and  processes 
outside  of the head.”  (2010b,  p. 567)  Hence,  the hypothesis  of an extended  state  space  entails  the 
hypothesis of an extended information  processing space in which problem solving occurs. Moreover, 
and this is an aspect unique to the approach offered by Menary, public vehicles manipulated during 
epistemic actions have their own norms “governing  how we are to manipulate token representational 
Please do not cite  
 
 
vehicles.” (2010b, p. 570) On Menary’s view, human cognitive capacities are shaped by the normative 
and social structure embodied in our recurrent socio-cultural practices, e.g., through participation in the 
practice of Tetris playing, the players have developed motor programmes for fast and fluent actions so 
as to transform  the zoids on the screen.  But, “the manipulation  of the buttons  is itself a normative 
practice,  something  that is learned  and habituated.”  (2010b,  p. 575) Cognitive  norms, therefore,  are 
socio-culturally constructed, and these environmental vehicles take precedence over their sensorimotor 
or higher-order  instantiations  – or are  first  in “public  space”  before  they  become  internalized  into 
“neural  space.”  What this case study shows  is that cognitive  integrationism  avoids  the C-C fallacy, 
since the capacity for engaging in epistemic actions are not first “internal” to the organism and then 
somehow are extended to include elements in the environment. Rather, epistemic actions are “in the 
problem  solving  state  space,  not  just  as  a  clever  strategy  for  off-loading   complexity   onto  the 
environment […], (2010b, p. 568) but as “part of our cognitive economy.” (2010b, p. 568) 
 
 
7. Mechanistic compositional organization 
 
 
The second dimension of the ontological claim supplements the MT by explaining the emergence of 
cognitive  properties  from the relation of composition  and mechanistic  explanation
1
.  In their seminal 
paper, Machamer and colleagues give this definition of a mechanism: 
 
 
“[…] mechanisms  are entities  and activities  organized  such that they are productive  of regular  changes 
from start or set-up to finish or termination.” (2000, p. 3) 
 
 
Mechanisms are typically composed of different kinds of entities (x’s) performing different kinds of 
activities (Φ’s), with the x’s and Φ’s organized such that they cooperatively produce a specific kind of 
behavior or performance of an overall mechanism (S's Ψ-ing). Generally, if we understand a cognitive 
system as a mechanism, extended or non-extended, a cognitive system has properties that are different 
from the properties of its individual parts. For instance, a system distributed across brain-body-world 
has different properties in regards to either the brain-body system or the brain or body (Hutchins 2011, 
p.  425).  Complex  properties  of  a  mechanism,  then,  exhibit  what  Theiner  calls  a  strong  form  of 
 
1 
There  is  a  slight  disagreement   in  the  mechanistic  literature  about  the  extent  to  which  one  can  apply  the 
mechanistic  framework  to cases of EC. In particular, Craver argues that “many cognitive mechanisms  draw upon 
resources  outside of the brain and outside of the body to such an extent that it is not fruitful to see the skin, or 
surface of the CNS, as a useful boundary […].” (2007, p. 141). However, Bechtel (2009) thinks that mechanism- 
style explanations  are more  compatible  with weaker  embodied  and situated  approaches  to cognition.  Note  that 
Bechtel does not think that this necessarily  must be this way. As he mentions (personal communication),  what is 
critical for a mechanistic  explanation  is first to identify the phenomenon  for which one is seeking an explanation. 
If the system accomplishing  the phenomenon functions as a result of causal interdependence  between an individual 
and artifacts,  then that is the place to locate  the explanation.  But, “my bet is that there will remain  the task of 
explaining  how the organism  engages their environment,  and that this phenomenon  is to be explained  inside the 
head and these will resemble the traditional explanations in cognitive psychology” (personal communication).  This 
emerging  picture between proponents  of mechanistic  explanation  as to whether the framework  can be applied to 
extended and distributed cognitive science is evidence, it seems to me, of an important fact, namely that the ideas 
of EC is being discussed outside the mainstream debates over EC. Moreover, as I have already mentioned, Theiner 
(2009)  as well  as Theiner  et al. (2010)  apply  mechanistic  explanation  to group  cognition,  and Theiner  (2011) 
appeals to the framework  of mechanistic  explanation  to resist the C-C fallacy in the context of his discussion  of 
extended reasoning. 
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organization-dependence (2009, p. 335). Wimsatt (1976, 1986) has argued that one way of determining 
the relevancy of the parts in a mechanism with respect to S's Ψ-ing is to contrast aggregative and non- 
aggregative modes of composition. The key in this distinction is between systems whose parts are 
interchangeable   (i.e.,  aggregative)   and  systems  whose  parts  are  not  interchangeable   (i.e.,  non- 
aggregative or mechanistic). Craver (2001), following Wimsatt, defines an aggregate system as follows 
(2001, pp. 58-59): “Suppose that a property Ψ of the whole S is a function of the properties {Φ₁, Φ₂, ..., 
Φn} of the parts {X₁, X₂, ..., Xn}. Then a Ψ property of S is an aggregate of the Φ properties of Xs 
when: 
 
 
1.     (W1) Ψ is invariant under the rearrangement and intersubstitution of Xs; 
 
2.     (W2) Ψ remains qualitatively similar (if quantitative, differing only in value) with the addition or 
 
subtraction of Xs; 
 
3.     (W3) Ψ remains invariant under the disaggregation and reaggregation of Xs; and 
 
4.     (W4) There are no cooperative or inhibitory interactions among the Xs that are relevant to Ψ.” 
 
5. 
 
A failure of a system to exhibit aggregativity, then, entails that the properties of the system as a whole 
are highly organization-dependent  and that it is possible to explain the overall behavior of the system in 
terms of its x’s and the interactions of its Φ’s in generating S's Ψ-ing. It follows from Wimsatt’s account 
of non-aggregativity that the emergence of higher-level properties in a system is a result of the system’s 
compositional organization. First, an extended system is hierarchically organized such that its parts are 
organized  at multiple different levels – some at the level of the brain, some at the level of the non- 
neural body, and some at the socio-cultural level. Second, an extended system exhibits a many-to-one 
compositional organization, where multiple different parts as well as the interactions among these parts 
determine S's Ψ-ing. Third, an extended system (although it also applies to non-extended  systems) is 
composed of heterogeneous  but complementary  parts working together in the assembly process of S's 
Ψ-ing. Fourth, an extended system (and again not limited to extended systems) is, according to Craver 
(2007,  pp. 134-139;  compare  Craver  & Bechtel  2007)  not only  composed  of x’s and  Φ’s  but also 
organized from various spatial, temporal and causal conditions and constraints. 
 
 
7.1. Case study #1: Tetris revisited 
 
 
In this section, I shall apply the mechanistic framework to the Tetris case in order to supplement the 
dimension focusing on bodily manipulations and cognitive norms. I shall argue that we can explain the 
emergence of skillful behavior in Tetris   (S’s Ψ-ing) as a result of the enabling system’s organization- 
dependent  structure  violating  the criteria  of aggregativity  (W1-W4).  First,  in violation  of condition 
(W4), the x’s and their Φ-ing cooperate in ways deeply relevant to S’s Ψ-ing. Without a particular part 
playing its role, the overall performance of S’s Ψ-ing would break down or be incomplete. This holds 
regardless of whether there is a malfunction in the parts located at the socio-cultural level or at various 
biological levels. Second, this implies that the distributed mechanism underlying skillful performance 
in Tetris is organized in a way violating condition (W2): subtracting or even adding component parts 
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cannot  be  achieved  without  disturbing  the  mechanisms  overall  ability  to  Ψ.  Hence,  subtracting  or 
adding parts to the mechanism is likely to result on qualitative dissimilarity with respect to Ψ. Third, in 
violation  of condition  (W1), the parts of the mechanism  cannot be rearranged  arbitrarily,  since what 
binds S’s Ψ-ing is the timing of the parts and their interactions (Kirsh 1995, p. 62). The idea of timing 
of  processing  marks  an  aspect  of  mechanistically  organized  systems  –  temporal  organization.  As 
Craver says: 
 
 
“The order, rate, and duration of successive component  activities are crucial for the [mechanism],  [and] it 
is not possible  to change their order without  interfering  with how the mechanism  works (or making  it a 
different mechanism entirely).” (2007, p. 138) 
 
 
In the Tetris study, the physical action of rotating a zoid generates neurobiological processes – Kirsh & 
Maglio term these ‘buffer icons’ – which, in turn, are reciprocally interacting with multiple different 
functional processes such as motor, attention, generation, and matching processes, while constantly 
modulated and constrained by higher-level sociocultural processes (Kirsh & Maglio 1994, p. 542). 
Furthermore, mechanisms are also spatially organized. As Craver says: The spatial organization of a 
mechanism includes, […], the sizes, shapes, structures, locations, orientations, directions, connections, 
and compartments of mechanisms.” (2007, p. 137) The importance of space in cognition has long been 
recognized as an essential part of the acquisition of abstract problem-solving  abilities (Kirsh 1995), of 
developing abstract concepts (Sheets-Johnstone  2011, p. 167), and so on. In Tetris, spatial organization 
takes  on  a  similar  role,  in  the  sense  that  the  effects  of  time-efficiency   and  transformation   of 
informational structure is due to the location of the zoids, their shapes, and the causal connectivity 
established by manipulation. If this is the case then we can understand how extended cognitive systems 
include   not  only  neural   processes   but  are  compositionally   organized   so  as  to  include   bodily 
manipulations   of  socio-cultural   processes   as  well.   This   is  what   supplements   Menary’s   claim: 
“Epistemic actions and computations take place within the same state space. If this state space is the 
problem-solving  state space,  then we have difficulty  in pulling  apart mind, action  and world  […].” 
(2007, p. 90) 
 
 
7.2. Case study #2: Emergence of socially distributed remembering 
 
 
In their study of socially distributed remembering  (or collaborative  recall), Sutton et al. (2010) argue 
that on some occasions,  long-term  couples have evolved  interactive,  dynamically  integrated  systems 
for collective memory of past events. Here is one of the dialogues, where a couple is acting in concert 
when remembering the beginning of their relationship (2010, p. 551): 
 
 
Husband: No, I asked her out that night, but she said she couldn’t go. 
 
Wife: No, that’s right. 
 
H: So then I started to pester her the next week. 
 
W: You did, you turned up after my [classes]. 
 
H: [Cooking classes]. 
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W: On Monday night. 
 
H: That’d be it. 
 
W: And took me for coffee. 
 
H: Yes, the next Monday night. 
 
W: And impressed me. 
 
H: Yes. 
 
 
Drawing on Wegner’s theory of transactive memory (1987), the authors indicate that it is quite likely 
that the successful  remembering  in this long-term  couple  is an organization-dependent  feature  of a 
“socially coupled dynamical system with emergent properties, which in certain cases can be highly 
integrated and enduring and exhibit high levels of continuous reciprocal causation.” (2010, p. 547) It is 
of course  true, as the authors  point out, that not all instances  of people  remembering  together  will 
involve interactive and dynamical processes, thereby exhibiting aggregative outcomes (2010, p. 552). 
But “in other cases each partner offers distinct but complementary  contributions to a shared emergent 
product.” (Sutton et al. 2010, p. 552) According to Sutton et al. (2010), remembering in this case is not 
the operation  of the naked brain on its own, with the other person merely an external influence.  As 
Wegner puts it: “A transactive memory structure thus can be said to reside in the memories of both 
individuals – when they are considered as a combined system.” (Wegner 1985, p. 257; quoted in Sutton 
et al. 2010, p. 547) Cases of socially distributed cognition are equally taken seriously by Theiner (2009, 
2011), Theiner & O’Connor (2010), and Theiner et al., (2010) who argue in favor of a revised version 
 
of the group  mind thesis.  Influenced  by anthropologically  sensitive  cognitive  science  (Hollan  et al. 
 
2000;  Hutchins  1995),  the philosophical  framework  of mechanistic  explanation  and  the transactive 
memory  approach,  Theiner  and colleagues  argue that recent studies  of group cognition  – especially 
problem solving cases – reveal that cognitive capacities that we normally would not hesitate to ascribe 
individual  cognizers  are also ascribable  to groups. What these case studies show, and as the one by 
Sutton  et al.,  shows,  is how  continuous  reciprocal  causation  between  people  in  a group  results  in 
emergent  cognitive  properties  at the group level. The point of contact between  my argument  in this 
paper and the work done by Theiner and colleagues is that we think that extended cognitive systems – 
including at the group level – have organization-dependent  cognitive capacities. As Theiner et al., says: 
“Group cognition is thus emergent phenomenon in the sense of Wimsatt (1986).” (2010, p. 378) In their 
study of socio-culturally  distributed cognition, Theiner and colleagues also report on the phenomenon 
of a transactive memory system (TMS). They distinguish between two components of a TMS. First a 
representational component, which “consists of the organized stock of memories that are retained by 
individual  members,  including  higher-order  memories  about  who knows  what.”  (2010,  p. 388) The 
second component is a procedural component, whose function is the continuous creation and constant 
maintenance of the representations, including “all direct and indirect communication processes […] by 
which individuals  cooperatively  allocate, encode, retrieve, share, and elaborate memories.”  (2010, p. 
388) Among the many areas of socially distributed remembering examined by Theiner et al., they look 
at how  TMS’s  have  been  used  in small  group  research.  In these  studies,  TMS’s  are used  as latent 
group-level variables. According to Theiner et al., TMS’s in small groups working on assembly tasks 
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become  manifested  in several  different  ways.  First  as memory differentiation:  “i.e.  the tendency  of 
group members to specialize in recalling distinct aspects of the assembly process.” (2010, p. 389) The 
second  is what they call task credibility:  “i.e. how much members  trusted  one another’s  expertise.” 
(2010, p. 389) And finally in terms of task coordination: “i.e. the effective use of transactive retrieval 
strategies […].” (2010, p. 389) From this, Theiner et al. report several findings. Groups perform much 
better when their members  undergo  training  on the task together,  and worse if each member  of the 
group went through the training individually. An important aspect of coordination and collaboration is 
that the process  of undergoing  training  together  establishes  “more elaborate,  accurate,  and mutually 
shared beliefs about the distribution of know-how in groups.” (Theiner et al. 2010, p. 389) 
 
 
8. Dissolving the coupling-constitution  fallacy 
 
 
I have already hinted at why Menary’s version of second-wave EC avoids the C-C fallacy. One horn of 
the C-C fallacy entails that the EC theorist commits an instance of the fallacy when an environmental 
resource deemed cognitive by being causally coupled to an individual cognitive agent. But this is not 
what Menary is arguing. As Menary schematizes the idea: “X is the manipulation of the notebook 
reciprocally  coupled  to  Y  –  the  brain  processes  –  which  together  constitute  Z,  the  process  of 
remembering.”  (2006, p. 333). So, the MT as a constitutive thesis does not infer cognitive status to an 
environmental  resource  simply  because  that resource  is causally  coupled  to a pre-existing  cognitive 
agent. Menary is clear about this when he says that the goal of cognitive integration is “to explain why 
X and Y are so coordinated that they together function as Z, which causes further behavior.” (2006, p. 
334) Hence, an extended cognitive property, Z, is an emergent property of a mechanistically composed 
system. It is not the case – as exemplified in the Tetris study – that cognition is first “inside” the head 
and then “extends outwards”! This claim can be further underpinned by Theiner et al’s use of the 
mechanistic  framework  to support  the idea of group  cognition  or socially  distributed  cognition.  As 
Theiner et al., argues: 
 
 
“To begin with, when we claim that an individual cognitive system X is on some principled way coupled to 
another individual cognitive system Y, we do not mean to imply that X is thus part of Y. Instead, what we 
assert is rather that the individuals who instantiate X and Y can engage in structured interactions so as to 
constitute  an organized  group-cognitive  system  Z that encompasses  those  individuals  among  its proper 
parts.” (2010, p. 390; italics added) 
 
 
Whereas Menary’s position deals primarily with the “process” version of the C-C fallacy, Theiner et al. 
set up an argument against the “systemic” version. The systemic version of the C-C fallacy holds that 
even if a cognitive system X is dynamically coupled to a cognitive system Y, it does not entail that X is 
part of Y. But this is not what Theiner  et al. are arguing.  What these authors  are stating is that the 
persons who “instantiate X and Y can engage in structured interactions so as to constitute an organized 
group-cognitive  system Z that encompasses  those individuals among its proper parts.” (2010, p. 390) 
We can follow Theiner et al. (2010), so as to argue that the case studies discussed here compose an 
organized cognitive system or process Z that encompasses  one or more individuals.  The Tetris study 
Please do not cite  
 
 
and the studies on socially distributed remembering “form an integrated system with functional gains.” 
(2010, p. 390) Theiner et al., following Wilson (in press), distinguish between three elements of what it 
means to be an integrated system with functional gains. First, “two (or more) elements are coupled just 
in case they exchange  information  by means of reliable,  two-way  causal connections  between  them 
[…],”  (Theiner  et al. 2010,  p. 390) so that the elements  “are interdependent  in their cognitive  and 
behavioral activities.” (Theiner et al. 2010, p. 390) In Sutton et al’s study of socially distributed 
remembering,   successful   remembering   is  an  organization-dependent   feature  of  such  continuous 
reciprocal causation. Second, “two (or more) coupled elements form an integrated system in situations 
in which they operate as a single causal whole […] – with causes affecting the resultant system as a 
whole, and the activities of that system as a whole producing certain effects.” (Theiner et al. 2010, p. 
390) In both Menary’s redeployment  of the Tetris case and in my explanation  of the Tetris study by 
applying the mechanistic framework, successful performance in Tetris is an emergent property of an 
organization-dependent  system failing to exhibit aggregativity.  Because of this, there is an integrated 
system underlying S’s Ψ-ing. Third, “an integratively coupled system shows functional gain just when 
it either enhances the existing functions of its coupled elements, or manifests novel functions relative to 
those possessed by any of its elements.” (Theiner et al. 2010, p. 390-91) Both the Tetris case and the 
Sutton et al. case of socially distributed remembering satisfy this condition. Also, we see this condition 
fulfilled in Theiner et al’s research  on small group cognition,  since the individual  members  perform 
better when working in joint collaboration rather than working alone. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
In this paper, I have argued that the proponent of EC is better off explaining the ontological claim of 
EC by exploring  the coordination  dynamics  between  “internal”  and “external”  resources  rather than 
opting for a metaphysical approach to the constitutive claim. In particular, of all the alternative ways of 
construing  the constitutive  claim in the EC literature, I have shown that only Menary’s manipulation 
thesis  provides  an  adequate  fertile  ground  for  making  EC’s  ontological  claim.  In  supplementing 
Menary’s position, I have argued that the philosophical accounts of mechanistic explanations can shed 
additional  light on EC’s ontological  claim.  I have shown  this by reference  to a few empirical  case 
studies across the dimensions  of “individual-artifact  EC” and “collective,  socio-culturally  distributed 
EC.” I hope to have shown that by approaching the constitutive claim from an empirically oriented 
perspective,  it  is  possible  to  resolve  the  C-C  fallacy.  I  end  this  paper  by  briefly  positioning  my 
argument that EC’s constitution claim can be re-evaluated by adopting the relation of composition in 
mechanistic  explanation  within the EC literature.  In order to do so, I shall apply Kirchhoff ’s (2011) 
taxonomy of first-, second-, and third-wave EC. As we have seen, first-wave EC attempts to ground 
constitution  by  way  of  functionalist  parity  arguments  and  second-wave  EC  in  terms  of 
complementarity  and cognitive integration.  Hence, my attempt to justify EC’s ontological  foundation 
based on the philosophical framework of mechanistic explanation arguably fits better with Kirchhoff ’s 
third-wave version of EC. 
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